Politics as the Instrument of Peace | Besesayo Kezo

Democracy in Societies Shaped by Insurgency and  Social Conflict 

Besesayo Kezo, IPS, Retd. DGP

In democratic societies, politics is the essential process by which free and equal citizens  collectively decide who holds power, how resources are shared, and which identities and  claims are recognized. It is the civilized alternative to force. Yet when a society is buffeted by  long-running insurgencies and deep social conflicts—ethnic rivalries, historical grievances,  and competing visions of belonging—the ordinary machinery of democratic politics is severely  strained. Armed groups establish parallel structures, communities fracture along identity lines,  and trust in institutions erodes. In such environments, most starkly visible in India’s Northeast,  the central challenge is whether democratic politics can deepen and adapt so that conflict is  absorbed into peaceful competition rather than defining the social order.

The Democratic Ideal and the Reality of Contested Societies 

Democratic politics rests on interlocking principles: periodic free elections that confer  legitimacy, the rule of law that constrains even those in power, the protection of fundamental  rights that permit dissent and organization, and institutions that enable peaceful alternation in  office. These features distinguish democracy from systems that rely primarily on coercion,  hereditary privilege, or a single party’s monopoly. In stable democracies, politics channels  disagreements over policy and identity into debate, legislation, and electoral contests. Citizens  accept outcomes they dislike because the rules of the game remain open and reversible.

In societies marked by insurgency and social conflict, these assumptions are repeatedly  tested. Insurgent groups often reject the state’s claim to exclusive legitimate authority, arguing  that historical incorporation was incomplete or unjust, or that certain communities have been  systematically marginalized. Social conflicts—over land, political representation, cultural  recognition, or demographic change—can harden into mutually reinforcing narratives of threat  and victimhood. The result is a politics that is democratic in form (elections occur, parties  compete) yet incomplete in substance (significant segments of the population view the state  or rival communities as existential adversaries). Northeast India offers a sustained illustration.  The region is home to more than two hundred ethnic groups, each with distinct languages,  customary institutions, and historical trajectories. Demands for autonomy or separation have  fueled decades of armed conflict alongside India’s formal democratic institutions.

Why Insurgency and Social Conflict Persist 

Insurgencies in democratic societies rarely stem from a simple lack of elections. They more  often reflect a combination of historical alienation, perceived failures of political inclusion,  economic disparities, and the availability of organizational and military capacity. In the  Northeast, the Naga movement’s 1947 declaration of independence, the subsequent armed  struggle, and the long search for a political settlement illustrate how foundational questions of  sovereignty and identity can outlast multiple generations of democratic governance. Similar  dynamics appear among other communities seeking greater autonomy or the protection of  land and customary rights.

Social conflicts compound the difficulty. Recent violence in Manipur between the Meitei and  Kuki-Zo communities, along with episodes involving Naga and Kuki-Zo groups, illustrates how  local disputes over land, political representation, and security can escalate quickly when inter community trust is low and armed actors remain influential. Dysfunctional or suspended Autonomous District Councils, incomplete implementation of earlier agreements, and the  persistence of security legislation such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act further  complicate the picture. While official data record substantial declines in insurgency-related  incidents, casualties, and civilian deaths over the past decade—an 82 percent reduction in  incidents between 2014 and 2025, according to Ministry of Home Affairs figures—the  underlying political questions remain unresolved. Reduced violence creates space for politics,  but it does not, by itself, generate the trust or institutional arrangements needed for durable  peace.

The presence of ceasefires and parallel governance structures, as seen in parts of the Naga  areas, creates a distinctive political equilibrium. Armed groups retain organizational capacity  and local influence, while formal state institutions continue to function. This hybrid order can  stabilize violence in the short term, yet it delays a conclusive political settlement and leaves  civilians navigating dual authorities. Democratic politics must therefore address not only the  grievances that fuel recruitment but also the institutional incentives that sustain protracted  stalemates.

Lessons from Past Settlements and Ongoing Processes 

India’s experience shows that political accommodation can end major insurgencies. The 1986  Mizo Accord remains the clearest success: after years of conflict, the Mizo National Front  renounced violence, entered electoral politics, and eventually formed the state government.  The settlement combined amnesty, rehabilitation, constitutional recognition of the state within  the Indian Union, and subsequent democratic competition. Bodo groups have achieved  similar, though less complete, outcomes through successive accords, most recently in 2020,  as have various smaller groups in Assam, Tripura, and Manipur. These cases show that when  insurgent leadership moderates its maximalist demands, the state offers credible power sharing or autonomy arrangements, and former combatants are integrated into civilian life and  politics, violence can give way to electoral contestation.

The Naga peace process illustrates both the potential and the limits of this approach. A  ceasefire with the NSCN (IM) has held since 1997. The 2015 Framework Agreement raised  expectations of a final settlement addressing shared sovereignty, a separate flag and  constitution, and the protection of Naga identity across state boundaries. Subsequent  agreements with the Naga National Political Groups expanded the circle of interlocutors. Yet  talks have stalled for years over the precise constitutional form that recognition of Naga  distinctiveness can take within the Indian Union, particularly after the abrogation of Article 370  heightened anxieties about the durability of special provisions such as Article 371A. Recent  appointments of interlocutors and the elevation of talks to the political level signal renewed  intent, but the core issues of mutual recognition and institutional design remain unresolved.  The process underscores a recurring lesson: technical or administrative measures are  insufficient when the dispute concerns a people’s political status and symbolic recognition.

Across the region, the pattern is consistent. Where political dialogue has been sustained and  inclusive, accompanied by tangible autonomy and development commitments, violence has  declined. Where talks are intermittent, exclusionary, or reduced to security management,  residual capacity for conflict remains. The sharp drop in overall insurgency incidents creates  an opportunity, but opportunity is not the same as a settlement.

The Distinctive Contribution of Democratic Politics 

Force can degrade an insurgent group’s military capacity; only politics can address the claims  that sustain it. Democratic politics offers several distinctive instruments. First, it provides a  nonviolent arena to articulate and negotiate competing visions of identity, autonomy, and  resource distribution. Parties, civil society organizations, customary institutions, and elected  bodies can serve as channels that reduce incentives to maintain armed wings. Second, federal and multi-level arrangements allow differentiated treatment of distinct communities without  dissolving the larger polity. Third, constitutional rights and an independent judiciary can protect  minorities and customary practices even when majorities shift. Fourth, regular elections create  accountability: governments that fail to deliver security, development, or fair process can be  replaced without civil war.

These instruments work only when they are credible. If significant groups believe the electoral  system systematically excludes them, that special protections can be unilaterally withdrawn,  or that security forces operate beyond effective oversight, the democratic alternative loses  appeal compared with continued resistance. Politics in conflict-affected democracies must  therefore be both competitive and protective—open to challenge yet constrained by rights and  procedures that outlast any single government. Civil society, churches, student organizations,  and women’s groups have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to build cross-community  pressure for dialogue; including them strengthens, rather than weakens, formal negotiations.

Pathways to Peaceful Resolution 

Durable peace requires a deliberate political strategy that combines dialogue, institutional  design, and social reconciliation. Several elements have proven relevant in comparative  experience and in the Northeast.

• Sustained, high-level political dialogue. Interlocutors and technical committees  are useful, but settling foundational questions requires direct engagement by  political leadership capable of making and defending compromises. Elevating  the Naga process to the ministerial level sends a positive signal that should be  matched by sustained attention and a clear mandate to explore constitutional  forms of recognition compatible with the Union.
• Inclusive participation. Agreements signed only with armed groups risk lacking  social legitimacy. Civil society, traditional institutions, elected representatives,  and representatives of affected communities across state boundaries should  have defined roles. The involvement of multiple Naga groups in earlier stages of  talks offers a partial model.
• Constitutional and institutional accommodation. Autonomy arrangements— whether strengthened Autonomous District Councils, territorial authorities such  as the proposed Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority, or carefully drafted  special provisions—can address identity and self-rule claims without secession.  When embedded in the constitutional order, protections for land, customary law,  and cultural symbols become more durable. Power-sharing within and across  communities reduces the zero-sum character of local politics.

• Linking development to political settlement. Infrastructure, education, and  livelihood packages are necessary but insufficient if people view them as  substitutes for political recognition. Development commitments gain credibility  when they are part of a broader agreement communities help shape and monitor.
• Security transition and accountability. As violence declines, the rationale for  exceptional security legislation weakens in specific areas. A calibrated, district level review of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, paired with strengthened  civilian policing and independent oversight of human-rights complaints, can  rebuild trust without creating security vacuums. Demobilization and  rehabilitation of former combatants must include pathways to civilian  employment and, where appropriate, to political life.
• Inter-community reconciliation. Ethnic violence, once ignited, leaves scars that  formal agreements alone cannot heal. Local peace committees, joint  development projects, and truth-telling or restorative processes, facilitated by  respected civic and religious leaders, can gradually rebuild social cohesion. The failure to operationalize earlier peace committees in Manipur underscores the  need for sustained, rather than episodic, engagement.
• Guarantees and sequencing. Negotiated settlements succeed when parties  believe commitments will be honored. Intermediate confidence-building  measures, transparent monitoring, and, where useful, limited third-party  facilitation can reduce the risk of defection. Sequencing matters: early, visible  gains in development and local governance can build constituencies for further  compromise on more sensitive symbolic issues.

Conclusion: Making Democratic Politics Real 

Politics in democratic societies is the organized contest for public power, governed by rules  that protect participation and limit domination. In regions long shaped by insurgency and social  conflict, that contest must widen and deepen until incentives to maintain armed capacity  diminish. India’s Northeast has already shown that major reductions in violence are possible  and that political settlements can transform former insurgents into electoral actors. The  remaining task is to complete the unfinished political work: craft durable arrangements that  recognize distinct identities and aspirations within a common constitutional framework, rebuild  inter-community trust where it has frayed, and ensure that democratic institutions are  perceived as protective rather than extractive or threatening.

Force can create the conditions for politics; only politics can turn those conditions into peace.  The measure of democratic maturity in conflict-affected societies is not the absence of  disagreement but the capacity to manage profound disagreement without resorting to  violence. Sustained dialogue, credible institutional design, inclusive participation, and the  patient work of social reconciliation build that capacity. When these elements are present,  politics ceases to be merely a means of conflict management and becomes an instrument for  resolving conflict.

(The views expressed are those of the writer and not of the newspaper)