The Naga people deserve transparency, accountability and clarity on their political future
A. Anato Swu Satakha Town
The Naga political issue has reached a stage where repeated assurances, closed-door discussions and political statements are no longer sufficient. After decades of negotiations, the Naga people deserve to know what has been achieved, what remains unresolved and what commitments have been made in their name.
I have examined a 30-page document titled “Competencies,” dated 2 January 2020 and marked “Top Secret” in the copy available to me. I cannot independently authenticate that copy or establish its formal negotiating status. It appears to reproduce the 2015 Framework Agreement and outlines proposals concerning political authority, constitutional arrangements, financial powers, territorial administration, security and economic development. These qualifications matter: the document should not be treated as a final or legally binding agreement unless the negotiating parties confirm that status.
The public discussion also needs to distinguish this 2020 document from other materials described as competencies. The Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) had a separate Status Paper connected with the 2017 Agreed Position. The Morung Express reported on 17 September 2020 that a four-page copy had surfaced online, and that sources in the Working Committee said the Status Paper had been shared with civil society organisations and tribal hohos in November 2019. The report noted that the status had since “evolved.” In July 2022, The Sentinel Assam reported that competencies associated with the 2017 Agreed Position had been shared with the public and media. These reports concern the NNPG track; they do not establish that the separate 2020 NSCN (I-M) document was publicly released in full.
In September 2020, NSCN (I-M) steering committee convener Hutovi Chishi was reported as saying that some competencies remained under negotiation and would be brought before the public “in due course” for wider consultation (The Economic Times, 11 September 2020). Six years later, the status and contents of the 2020 document remain contested in public statements. On 23 September 2026, Nagaland Post reported that the NSCN Provisional Government rejected the document said to have been submitted on 2 January 2020 and cited provisions it opposed. That statement is a position taken by that body; it does not, by itself, authenticate the document or settle what the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) accepted.
A further development was reported by Nagaland Post on 16 February 2026: competencies submitted by the Naga National Political Alliance (NNPA) were described at a Tatar Hoho session as an addendum to a common draft, pending final inking. I have not located the text of that addendum in the public record. Its existence therefore does not answer questions about the contents or status of the 2020 document.
Taken together, the record shows that “competencies” may refer to different documents and negotiating tracks. Public debate should identify which document is being discussed, who prepared or submitted it, to whom, and whether its contents were proposed, accepted, revised or rejected.
The Framework Agreement, the Agreed Position and the 2020 Competencies
The Framework Agreement was signed on 3 August 2015 between the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M). The Agreed Position was signed on 17 November 2017 between the Government of India and the Working Committee of the NNPGs. They are separate instruments involving different negotiating parties. Neither should be casually equated with the 2020 “Competencies” copy or with the later-reported NNPA addendum.
The Framework Agreement was presented as setting broad parameters for a final settlement. In a 2017 parliamentary reply, the Ministry of Home Affairs said that a final accord had not yet been signed. The central question is therefore not simply whether an agreement exists, but how the parties understand its relationship to subsequent proposals and what, if anything, is now mutually settled.
If the 2020 document outlines a proposed People’s Government of Nagaland (PGN), what authority would that body exercise? Which powers would belong exclusively to Naga institutions, which would be shared with the Government of India, and which would remain with the Union? What constitutional safeguards would apply? These are fundamental public questions, not merely technical details.
A proposal with far-reaching implications
The copy I examined includes proposals relating to Naga identity, a proposed PGN, land and natural resources, financial arrangements, regional territorial councils, cultural and educational institutions, and security arrangements. It also refers to a proposed development fund with a corpus of ¹ 20,000 crore over 50 years.
If such provisions were formally agreed, adequately funded and legally protected, they could have far-reaching implications for self-government and economic development. But a proposal is not a guarantee. A development fund would require a clear funding structure, assured contributions, transparent administration and independent auditing. Proposed constitutional powers would need enforceable legal provisions.
The public should be told whether the proposed fund would be additional to existing allocations, a guaranteed obligation or a proposal subject to future budget decisions. The same clarity is needed for every major provision: what is the source, what is the legal effect, and what mechanism would ensure implementation?
Questions the agreements and competencies leave open
The documents and public statements raise several areas requiring clarification.
First, the meaning of sovereignty and the division of powers need precise explanation. If the proposed PGN would exercise authority in specified areas, which areas are exclusive, shared or reserved to the Union Government?
Second, the Framework Agreement, the Agreed Position and the 2020 Competencies should be considered separately and then explained together. Which provisions from each track have been mutually accepted? Which remain contested, have been revised or require further negotiation?
Third, the issue of integration of contiguous Naga-inhabited areas remains politically sensitive and unresolved. Recognition of an aspiration is not the same as implementation. Any proposed regional arrangement must account for constitutional processes and the legitimate concerns of affected communities in neighbouring states.
Fourth, proposed financial arrangements require clear funding formulas, payment schedules and accountability mechanisms. Fifth, any security transition needs a credible, phased plan with safeguards for civilians. Sixth, proposed institutions—including the Tatar Hoho, regional councils and Pan Naga Hoho—need clear rules for representation, accountability and minority protections.
Finally, implementation would require timelines, independent monitoring, dispute-resolution procedures and remedies for non-compliance. Without such safeguards, even an ambitious political arrangement could become another source of uncertainty.
Confidentiality cannot become indefinite silence
Confidentiality during sensitive negotiations can be justified. Negotiators need room to explore difficult compromises. But temporary confidentiality during talks is different from leaving the public without an authoritative account of a proposed settlement for years.
The NSCN (I-M) said in 2020 that some competencies remained under negotiation and promised wider consultation in due course. The NNPG Status Paper, meanwhile, was separately circulated and discussed publicly. The 2026 rejection of the 2020 document by the NSCN Provisional Government has made it more urgent for the parties to clarify whether that document was a proposal, a negotiating submission, a jointly accepted text, or something else.
The late Isak Chishi Swu is no longer with us, and R. N. Ravi is no longer the interlocutor. Th. Muivah, as the surviving senior signatory of the Framework Agreement and a central figure in the NSCN (I-M), should explain the origin, negotiating history and present status of the 2020 Competencies. The Government of India should state which provisions, if any, it accepted, which remain under consideration, and which were never approved.
This is not an accusation against either negotiating party. It is a request for political accountability. The public deserves to know whether the parties are discussing the same document and whether the contents have changed over time.
The precise issue is this: while the NNPGs’ separate Status Paper and related competencies were publicly circulated and discussed, the full text and authoritative negotiating status of the 2 January 2020 “Competencies” document remain unclear. The parties should confirm its authenticity, identify which provisions—if any—were mutually accepted, and explain what remains under negotiation.
A new opportunity demands a clear public account
Developments in 2026 offer an opportunity to renew the peace process. The appointment of Ajit Lal as the Government of India’s interlocutor and reports of proposed Union ministerial involvement have raised expectations. The NSCN (I-M) welcomed the new interlocutor and ministerial participation, while Nagaland’s leaders and civil society groups have continued to call for political engagement and an inclusive approach.
A change of interlocutor or a higher-level negotiating framework cannot by itself resolve fundamental differences. The new process should review the Framework Agreement, the Agreed Position, the 2020 Competencies and any later proposals such as the reported NNPA addendum. The parties should publish an authoritative status account that distinguishes agreed commitments from proposals and unresolved matters.
The Naga people should not have to rely on leaks, partial copies or competing public statements to understand a process that will shape their future. The Government of Nagaland, tribal hohos, civil society organisations, churches, student bodies, women’s organisations and elected representatives can help seek a common, fact-based public briefing.
From discussion to accountability
The objective should not be to undermine negotiations or dismiss the work of those who have pursued a settlement. It is to ensure that the aspirations and interests of the Naga people are not compromised by ambiguity, incomplete records or commitments that cannot be enforced.
The parties should clarify, in a form accessible to the public, the status of each agreement and related document; which provisions are mutually accepted; what remains contested; and how any eventual settlement would be implemented and monitored. Sensitive negotiating details may be protected where necessary, but the essential political and constitutional commitments must ultimately be open to informed public scrutiny.
Progress should be measured not only by meetings and statements, but by clearly defined outcomes, legally protected commitments and an implementable settlement. The Naga people are not asking for privileged access to negotiations. They are asking to understand the agreements and proposals that may determine their political future. Why should they be expected to accept or reject a settlement before its terms and status are made clear?
(The views expressed are those of the writer and not of the newspaper)
