A truck carrying 7,740 bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), estimated to be worth around Rs 50 lakh, was intercepted in Zubza on September 28. The driver was taken into custody. Police said they were investigating the source of the consignment and trying to identify its supplier, owner and intended buyer.
The seizure was significant, but it raised a question that Nagaland’s enforcement agencies have struggled to answer: who is supplying illegal liquor to the state, and why is it so difficult to trace the people behind the trade?
The concern was acknowledged by Director General of Police (DGP) Rupin Sharma on September 29. He admitted that police had been unable to trace the backward links of the liquor trade, including who was bringing the liquor, where it was coming from and where it was going.
“Unfortunately, we have not been able to go into the backward linkages of who brings it, where they bring it, where they bring it from,” Sharma said, according to reports of his interaction with journalists.
He said police would consider setting up a higher-level Special Investigation Team (SIT) to examine liquor trafficking across the state. At the time, no decision had been taken.
Sharma also acknowledged that enforcement often catches retailers and small-time transporters rather than people higher up the supply chain.
His admission puts the focus on a question beyond the number of bottles seized: are investigations reaching the people who organise the trade, or are they primarily identifying those caught handling the liquor?
A Rs 50 lakh consignment, but who was waiting for it?
The Zubza seizure offers a clear example of the questions investigators need to answer.
According to Kohima Police, the transport carrier was intercepted during routine checking at around 2:35 pm on September 28. It was carrying 7,740 bottles of IMFL, each with a capacity of 750 ml. The estimated value was around Rs 50 lakh.
Police also reported that the vehicle had a “BSF Duty” marking on its windshield. The marking was being examined as part of the investigation into how the consignment was transported.
The driver was taken into custody, but the police announcement did not identify the supplier or intended buyer. The investigation was said to be underway to establish their identities.
A driver may be able to tell investigators who hired the vehicle, where the load was collected and where it was supposed to be delivered. Transport records, phone communications, payment trails and links to previous seizures could help establish whether the consignment was part of a wider operation.
However, the available public information does not establish who arranged this particular shipment or whether it was connected to other cases.
It is important to distinguish between a supplier who has not been identified and one whose identity has not been made public. The absence of a public update does not, by itself, establish that investigators have made no progress.
The questions that remain unanswered publicly are specific: where was the liquor loaded, who paid for its transportation, who owned the stock and who was supposed to receive it?
Police point to suppliers outside Nagaland
One difficulty, according to Sharma, is that the liquor appears to be coming from outside the state, which has no manufacturing facility for the liquor in question.
Nagaland has prohibited liquor under the Nagaland Liquor Total Prohibition (NLTP) Act, 1989. However, the manufacture and sale of liquor may be legal in neighbouring states. Identifying a consignment within Nagaland does not automatically establish its full route or identify everyone involved in moving it.
Investigators may need to establish where the stock originated, who arranged its transportation across state borders, who financed the purchase and who distributed it after arrival. This can require cooperation between law-enforcement agencies in different states and evidence that can support further legal action.
On September 29, Additional Director General of Police Sandeep M Tamgadge said investigators had identified places outside Nagaland from which some suspected liquor had allegedly been procured. However, he said concrete evidence was needed before further legal action could be taken.
His statement suggested that investigators had leads in at least some cases. But the public reports reviewed for this article do not identify all the alleged sources or establish what action has followed those leads.
The distinction matters. Identifying a possible source is one stage of an investigation; establishing the people responsible and gathering sufficient evidence for legal action is another.
A regional supply chain?
A seizure at the Kushiabill Interstate Excise Check Gate in July provides another example of the cross-border movement of suspected illicit liquor.
On July 11, Excise officials seized approximately 2,800 litres of suspected adulterated IMFL, along with colouring agents, empty liquor bottles and cartons reportedly intended for repackaging. Two men from Assam were arrested. The seized materials were estimated to be worth Rs 14–15 lakh.
According to a report published by Nagaland Post on July 14, the consignment originated from Rangai in Assam’s Karbi Anglong district and was reportedly headed towards Maram in Manipur, where the liquor was to be delivered to a person identified as “Raju”.
The case should not be treated as proof that the consignment was intended for sale in Nagaland. Its reported destination was Manipur.
The seized materials nevertheless raise questions about the suspected operation: who supplied the liquor, who was to adulterate and repackage it, who was financing the process and who would ultimately distribute the product?
The report said samples would be sent for chemical analysis and that further investigation was underway. The public reports reviewed for this article did not establish the full network or the outcome of the investigation.
The case illustrates why identifying the people physically transporting liquor may not be enough to uncover the people organising its supply and distribution. It also shows why investigators need to establish the route and destination of each consignment rather than assume that all liquor moving through the region is intended for Nagaland.
Allegations of collusion need answers
The possibility of a wider network has also been raised by civil society organisations.
In June, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) called for a swift and transparent inquiry into allegations of collusion between liquor smugglers and certain law-enforcement personnel. Its statement followed the interception of an IMFL-laden truck near Jotsoma by youth volunteers, including members of the Angami Youth Organisation and local organisations.
The NBCC described the allegations as serious and called for an investigation, protection for whistleblowers and accountability if wrongdoing was established. It also said that anyone wrongly accused should be cleared.
The allegations have not been established as proven collusion by named officials in the material reviewed for this article.
Separately, an open letter published in March by church representatives from the Dimapur area alleged systemic corruption and syndicate networks operating within some Naga national groups and their personnel. The letter called on the government to identify and dismantle such networks.
These are allegations made by civil society organisations, not findings that can be treated as established fact without supporting evidence.
They nevertheless raise questions that authorities should address: have claims of collusion and organised supply networks been investigated, and what have those investigations found? If inquiries have been conducted, have any findings or subsequent actions been made public?
The available material does not establish that official protection is responsible for the difficulty in tracing suppliers. That possibility should be investigated on the basis of evidence, rather than assumed.
A department stretched thin
The Excise and Prohibition Department has itself acknowledged problems with enforcement.
At a review meeting on August 11, the department cited porous borders, a shortage of manpower, the discontinuation of inter-district check-gates, outdated firearms and limited operational mobility.
It reported one Excise personnel for every 6,000 people, compared with one for every 2,000 in Mizoram.
The department’s annual administrative report recorded 1,863 liquor-related cases between February and December 2025. During that period, it reported seizing 18,112 bottles of IMFL, 22,007 litres of country liquor and 6,049 bottles or cans of beer.
These figures show the scale of enforcement activity, but they do not reveal how many investigations identified suppliers, how many cases led to convictions or how many separate consignments were traced to a common source.
The distinction matters. Seizing liquor removes a consignment from circulation, but it does not necessarily dismantle the operation that supplied it.
A more complete picture would require information on what happens after a seizure: whether investigators identify the people who arranged the transport, trace the money involved, establish the intended destination and pursue leads beyond the immediate seller or driver.
Recent enforcement also shows that seizures have continued. On October 14, police seized 581.520 litres of IMFL during searches at suspected liquor-selling and storage locations around Medziphema, Jharnapani Junction and adjoining areas along National Highway 29. Two people suspected of involvement in liquor sales were detained and later released on personal recognisance bonds.
The police statement described the operation as part of efforts to curb illegal liquor sales and storage. It did not establish whether the investigation had identified the suppliers behind the seized stock.
The latest seizure adds to the enforcement record, but the publicly reported information does not answer the broader question of how far investigations have progressed beyond the people found selling or storing liquor.
Sharma has also acknowledged that police and Excise could coordinate more closely. The departments have different responsibilities under the prohibition law, making cooperation important when evidence collected during an operation needs to support further investigation and legal proceedings.
The law must also be followed
A November 2024 Gauhati High Court judgment highlighted a procedural issue in nine cases under the NLTP Act.
The cases had originated with police FIRs and charge sheets. The court examined Section 43 of the Act, which requires a complaint by the Director of Prohibition or an authorised officer before a court can take cognisance of an offence under the Act. It held that the procedure followed in those nine cases did not meet the statutory requirements.
The ruling concerned those cases. It did not declare every liquor case in Nagaland invalid.
In September 2026, Tamgadge said a written complaint from an Excise official was required for police to register an FIR for an offence under the NLTP Act. He explained that police cases relating to suspected liquor deaths had been registered separately.
These requirements make coordination between departments important. Investigators must establish what happened and who was involved, while ensuring that the correct legal procedures are followed.
Has a higher-level investigation been constituted?
When Sharma spoke to journalists on September 29, he said police would consider a higher-level SIT to examine liquor trafficking across Nagaland. He said no decision had been taken at that time.
As of October 20, the public reports reviewed for this article did not confirm whether a state-level SIT had subsequently been constituted.
The missing link
Nagaland’s prohibition law has been in place for decades, yet illegal liquor continues to be seized across the state. Enforcement agencies have cited resource constraints, cross-border difficulties and the need for closer coordination. Police have also acknowledged that tracing the backward links of the trade has been a challenge.
Civil society organisations have raised allegations of collusion and organised supply networks, while the Excise Department has reported substantial enforcement activity. These facts do not prove that a single network controls the trade or that powerful individuals are protecting it.
For now, seizure figures and arrest announcements provide a record of enforcement activity, but they do not offer a complete picture of investigative outcomes. The public needs to know not only how much liquor is seized, but also whether those investigations identify the people who supplied it, how far the evidence leads and what action follows.
The central question is not simply how illegal liquor reaches Nagaland. It is how far investigations have travelled beyond the point of seizure – and whether the people behind the supply are being identified and held accountable.